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Yeshiva might easily never have happened. With the foolish vote of a single justice, swayed by 
the judicial activism of a former law-school administrator, an absurd law came into being. 
Today he’s known for a more recent liberal voting record, but it was his moderate 
conservatism that led Gerald Ford to appoint John Paul Stevens a Justice of the Supreme Court in 
1975. It seems fitting that Stevens featured the theme of “learning on the job” in appearances 
leading up to his retirement in 2010. During the first few years of his appointment, Stevens voted 
to reinstate the death penalty, to restrict first amendment rights, and to oppose affirmative action 
in university admissions. In later decisions, however, he joined in decisions opposing or chipping 
away at all of these positions.  
The same can be said for his service as the fifth vote in the Yeshiva decision, which packed a 
last-ditch legal fiction by an intransigent, lawbreaking employer into a poison pill still spreading 
through U. S. labor law. Since denying Yeshiva’s tenured faculty bargaining rights explicitly 
delineated for “professional employees” by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) with the 
fiction that participating in shared governance made them essentially “managerial” (thus 
excluded from NLRA protections), the majority opinion swiftly metastasized beyond the 
academy into hundreds of other workplaces, especially health care, with hundreds of thousands 
of nurses with modest “supervisory” duties losing long-established bargaining rights. (Not 
incidentally, the majority opinion also crushed several nascent efforts to organize physicians’ 
unions in the managed-care industry.) By 2001, Justice Stevens had flip-flopped on the 
managerial exclusion and composed a dissent in the key health-care case aiming – and failing – 
to contain the spreading influence of his earlier assent in Yeshiva. 
A one-time graduate student in English, Stevens’s own vote, together with the views of his 
colleagues in the Yeshiva majority, may well have been informed by hazy, fatuous old-boys’ club 
recollections of university life, as Justice Brennan’s blistering dissent alleges: “The court’s 
perception of the Yeshiva faculty’s status is distorted by the rose-colored lens through which it 
views the governance structure of the modern-day university.”1 But the real judicial activist 
behind Yeshiva was operating on more than hazy liberal-arts experiences; he was projecting 
views developed as a long-serving member of campus administration. Thomas Hughes Mulligan 
graduated from Fordham, stayed there for his J. D., and then served in counter-intelligence, 
before returning to his alma mater as a law professor. From 1956 to 1971, Mulligan served as 
dean of Fordham Law School, until he was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals by 
Richard Nixon. As some of his speeches on the subject of his 1960s term as dean make clear, he 
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preferred power concentrated in the administration, and viewed with contempt most of the values 
expressed by the rising power of faculty and students. 
As a long-serving administrator at an institution much like Yeshiva who had spoken out about 
the need to contain the rising influence of faculty, Mulligan might reasonably have recused 
himself from the Yeshiva case when it came before the Second Circuit. Instead, he took the lead 
among his colleagues and wrote the opinion, an astonishingly creative misconstruction of the 
faculty role in shared governance. Engaging in the most blatant form of judicial activism, the 
Second Circuit substituted its idiosyncratic judgment for the judgment of the agency assigned to 
interpret the National Labor Relations Act, and refused to order enforcement of the Board’s 
decision. 
Before Dean Mulligan got hold of the case, the law governing faculty bargaining rights 
approached crystal clarity, with the National Labor Relations Act clearly delineating those rights 
for “professional employees.” Through the late 1960s and the ’70s, faculty at institutions of all 
types bargained successfully, and, in public non-research institutions, unionization had swiftly 
become simply the norm (as was already the case for public schoolteachers, who had joined with 
other public-sector employees to win sweeping new legal protections for bargaining rights). 
When the faculty at Yeshiva organized, as at dozens of other private institutions, the National 
Labor Relations Board quickly certified the union and swept aside the administration's claim that 
faculty input over hiring and evaluation, and control over curricula and grading, turned them into 
“managerial employees” excluded from the Act’s protections. When Yeshiva subsequently 
refused to bargain, the NLRB ordered them to the table. 
Today, faculty at over 1,000 public college and university campuses bargain collectively. The 
only reason hundreds of private campuses aren’t likewise organized is the specious reasoning 
embodied in the transparently union-hostile opinion of Dean Mulligan’s Second Circuit, 
followed by the foggy vote of John Paul Stevens. As a matter of law, Yeshiva is a travesty and 
should be overturned. 
As a matter of practice, however, Yeshiva is losing relevance. Since three-quarters of all 
faculty are now graduate students or lecturers on casual appointment, they can hardly be 
described as managerial, and can’t be denied bargaining rights on that basis. 
Instead, today, private institutions with a religious affiliation rely on defenses based in the 
claim that faculty employees at “religious institutions” are excluded from NLRA protections. 
While the NLRB has consistently distinguished between institutions with a substantial religious 
character and those with a religious affiliation, a 2002 D. C. Circuit Court opinion involving the 
University of Great Falls, a small Montana institution, radically undermined the Board’s 
authority. Under Great Falls, courts may compel the NLRB to accept at face value the claims to 
a religious exemption of any institution that “presents itself to the public” as a religious 
institution. Denying NLRB the power to distinguish between real and false claims to the 
exemption is a transparent assault on long-established employee rights and protections – until 
this bad law is overturned, under the ruling, essentially, any employer that claims the exemption 
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may have it. Unlike Yeshiva, the ruling applies comprehensively – to part-time faculty, students, 
and non-teaching staff.
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Sadly, this sweeping, radical new barrier to organizing came into being in much the same way 
that Yeshiva did, with the determination of a conservative activist Circuit Court judge. Backed by 
Jesse Helms and appointed by Ronald Reagan to fill the seat vacated by Antonin Scalia’s 
elevation to the Supreme Court, and at this writing the chief justice of the D. C. Circuit, David 
Sentelle has been described by The New York Times as “one of the federal judiciary’s most 
extreme conservatives.”3 Sentelle’s vote was instrumental in overturning the convictions of 
Oliver North and John Poindexter. He replaced the moderate Robert Fiske with the right-wing 
ideologue Kenneth Starr as independent counsel in the Whitewater investigation. A long-term 
Republican party operative, even four years after his appointment to the federal bench, Sentelle 
was still publishing right-wing screeds against “leftist heretics” who he claimed sought to 
establish “a collectivist, egalitarian, materialistic, race-conscious, hyper-secular, and socially 
permissive state.” 4 
Sentelle’s transparently activist opinion in the 2002 Great Falls decision gutted the NLRB’s 
authority so far beyond reason that several attempts were mounted as a test of the ruling. The 
best of these came forward in March 2009, during the first year of the Obama administration. 
Fully supported by the NLRB’s ruling that the school’s ties to the Presbyterian Church were too 
insubstantial to justify a religious exemption, the UAW-affiliated faculty of Carroll College, like 
the faculty of Yeshiva, simply came to Federal court seeking enforcement of the Board’s ruling 
in its case. But who did the NLRB and the faculty union find waiting for them? A fellow named 
Thomas Griffith, who arrived at the D. C. Circuit Court directly from a five-year stint as general 
counsel and assistant to the president of Brigham Young University. 
Unsurprisingly for the recent former general counsel of a religiously-affiliated university, 
Griffith’s 2009 opinion in the Carroll case bluntly applies the 2002 ruling advanced by his 
sitting chief: “Under Great Falls, Carroll is exempt from the NLRB’s jurisdiction. We thus need 
not address Carroll’s argument that its faculty members are managerial employees who fall 
outside the protection of the NLRA. We grant Carroll’s petition for review, vacate the decision 
and order of the NLRB, and deny the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement.”5 
So now what? When we face these shabby rulings, does it make sense for us to assume that 
the decision proceeded from ultimately reasonable arguments advanced by truth-seekers? Are 
they arguments put forward in an adversarial system but refereed with a reasonable degree of 
impartiality and with the prospect of eventual accountability in higher courts? Of course not. We 
need to see clearly that these are specious, intellectually dishonest arguments by activist 
reactionaries abusing the power of the bench to deny fundamental human rights. We need to see 
clearly that these rulings are the product of a flawed, inherently political process that is likely to 
disadvantage both truth and justice for decades to come. Few observers would say, for instance, 
that the current Supreme Court is the place to test David Sentelle’s opinion in Great Falls. 
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But if the Supreme Court can’t help us, what should we do? If the United Auto Workers and 
American Federation of Teachers aren’t willing to spend any more of their resources fighting a 
corrupt judiciary, what should we do? 
Ultimately what Yeshiva (1980), Great Falls (2002) and Carroll (2009) teach us is simple: 
what matters more than the law is the movement. The individuals who used (or abused) their 
power in these decisions were part of a social reaction to liberation movements of the 1960s and 
1970s, including workplace democracy, feminism, and civil rights. They aren’t lone wolves; 
they’re conservative activists bound in a net of common culture, values, and mutual support. 
They didn’t have law, precedent, or reason on their side; they simply imposed their will and 
made new law out of the power represented by their movement. 
It would be tremendously foolish if we permitted any of these rulings to constrain us. We can 
build a movement with the students, nurses, young lawyers, schoolteachers, and countless others 
affected by exploitative and super-exploitative patterns of employment. We can overcome this 
dense lattice of hostile law. We can and must imitate the 1960s movement of public employees 
whose self-organization was illegal and yet also an unstoppable force for writing new law 
reflecting truth, justice, fairness, and democracy. 
Is Yeshiva relevant? Are Great Falls and Carroll? Not to a movement, no – no more so than 
any of the thousands of municipal statutes once theoretically constraining the movement of 
schoolteachers and sanitation workers. The tightest straps on those schoolteachers and sanitation 
workers were never the law; they were emotional and intellectual and habitual – habits of 
deference to, and trust in, authority. They burst free. We can too. 
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